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How did a country in the middle of Western Europe, starting almost from scratch, reach the European top
3 in terms of solar PV capacity in ﬁve years? And what were the costs? We provide a systematic
chronological review of the different governmental support instruments that drove the exponential
growth of the solar energy market in the Flanders region of Belgium and calculate their relative con-
tributions. The results of the economic calculations show that green electricity certiﬁcates had by far the
greatest effect on both the rise and stagnation of the market, costing about 1.5 billion euro only for 2006–
2013. The long-term societal costs of such growth proved to be even higher (6.7 billion for 2014–2031)
and unevenly distributed, with residents paying the highest price via their energy bills. Companies
continuously adapted their organizations to enact the available support instruments. Counter-intuitively,
the substantial support shifted the attention of companies to the larger systems, even though the
incentive for investment in PV was lower than for the smaller systems.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
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Over the past decade it has become increasingly clear that our
current electricity system is unsustainable. An uneven spread of
resources, depletion, and air pollution have caused problems and
conﬂicts all over the world. In response, many developed countriesr Ltd. This is an open access article
).have designed renewable energy policies. Renewable energy
sources like PV could provide the solution to energy-related
environmental and political issues.
Belgium, by no means a champion in terms of sun irradiation
due to its geographical location, entered the European top 3 in
2012 in terms of installed capacity per inhabitant in Europe [1].
The Belgium federal state is divided into three main regions:
Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels. By the end of 2013 about 70% of
Belgium's 3 GW capacity was installed in the Flanders region [2]under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Fig. 1. Cumulative installed capacity of small (o¼10 kW), medium
(410,o¼250 kW) and large systems (4250 kW) [adapted from [3]].
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large systems grew exponentially in Flanders (see Fig. 1). These
were mostly Building Added PV (BAPV) or stand-alone systems.
However, by mid-2012, severe cuts in support led to stagnation. In
this paper we employ transition studies literature to explore what
governmental support instruments caused this considerable
growth and stagnation.
Society is facing many negative externalities from our current
production and consumption systems for energy, mobility and
food. There is a major need for the transition of such socio-
technical systems toward more sustainable ones [4]. Such a pro-
cess is systemic in nature and requires a radical shift from the
status quo. However, the mainstream system in place has its own
logic, forming a barrier to sustainable innovation [4] and [5].
Therefore, a protected space called a niche is needed as a nurturing
place, from where new innovations can scale up and alter the
mainstream system [4].
Governments enable the development and implementation of
new sustainable innovations by actively shielding them from
mainstream selection pressures [6]. Active shielding measures
inﬂuencing the supply side include various ﬁnancial incentives
covering production, investment and ﬁnancing support [6–8]. It is
also possible to inﬂuence the demand side through for example
quotas or providing information to end users. Thereby the gov-
ernment directly inﬂuences the ‘volume, distribution and types of
opportunities available’ [9, p 341]. Additionally, institutional the-
orists argue that institutional processes (rules, norms, beliefs)
inﬂuence economic systems [10].
The inﬂuence of governmental policies on the expanding
renewable energy market has been widely studied (e.g. [7,8,11–18]
and [19]). Some studies evaluate support instruments for PV
market deployment speciﬁcally, often with a focus on the impact
of feed-in-tariffs (e.g. [20–26]). Mormann uses empirical evidence
from the US to demonstrate how its existing tax credits system is
providing an incentive for renewable energy market players to
create investment structures that lead to higher transaction costs
and less efﬁcient support, indicating the importance of careful
policy design [27]. Verbruggen and Lauber indicate the cost-
beneﬁt allocation of support instruments as important indicator
[8]. Considering the variety of the possible support instruments,
our research aim is to investigate which form of active shielding
had the greatest impact on the growth of installed capacity in
Flanders in 2006–2013 and what were the costs of this support.
Additionally, we aim to investigate the effect of such support
instruments on Flemish PV companies' activities and performance.
In the following we ﬁrst discuss our research methodology after
which we present the results of our study. We provide an over-
view of the different support instruments in place and their rela-
tive contributions as well as discuss in detail the main support
instrument during the time of our study, the green certiﬁcate
scheme. We continue by an analysis of the effect of such supportinstruments on ﬁrm activities and performance and end the paper
with a discussion of our main ﬁndings and a conclusion section.2. Methodology and data collection
We conducted a mixed methods study, employing a sequential
quantitative-qualitative approach, where the qualitative part had a
complementary and developmental function [28]. We used pri-
mary and secondary data sources to explore the effects of gov-
ernmental support instruments on market growth in the Flanders
region of Belgium from 2006 until 2013 – the period when Flan-
ders experienced exponential installed PV capacity growth. Due to
the complex structure of the Belgian energy market, we searched
databases and ofﬁcial reports of players operating at various levels
to map the energy market and installed PV capacity over time, also
to identify the PV-related support instruments in place during our
studies. The Committee for Regulation of Electricity and Gas
(CREG) controls and evaluates the regulations set by the Belgium
government [29]. It also organizes the accreditation of supply
permits for the transmission network [30]. Additionally, the
Flemish Regulator for the Electricity and Gas market (VREG) spe-
ciﬁcally regulates the distribution network (i.e. tariff setting is
controlled by CREG), deals with complaints, acts as mediator in
conﬂicts, advices the Flemish authorities and grants green certi-
ﬁcates and heat and power certiﬁcates [31]. The Flemish Energy
Agency (VEA), an autonomous agency of the Flemish ministry of
environment, nature and energy, designs, implements and evalu-
ates new energy-related policies [32]. Additionally, we read
International Energy Agency (IEA) and PV Vlaanderen (Flemish PV
trade association) reports. We also calculated the ﬂuctuations in
relevant support over time (see Appendix A). The main assump-
tions for our calculations were a system lifetime of 20 years, linear
degradation of the system (0.8% annually [33]), and considering
prices excluding VAT unless we found evidence in data suggesting
otherwise, thereby taking a conservative stance. Additionally,
unless indicated else we assume tax deduction schemes to be
applicable for one year only, again following a conservative line of
thought. This data, together with the changes in PV panel and
electricity prices per segment, enabled us to calculate the relative
importance of each governmental support instrument and the
resulting ﬁnancial attractiveness of typical small, medium and
large-scale PV installations. For all systems we assumed self-
investment, which also corresponds to the conservative calcula-
tion of the governmental support since the ﬁnancing support from
the government is not being used under this assumption. The
results also showed the high importance of the green certiﬁcate
instrument which was therefore further analyzed in terms of
working and analysis of costs involved [8] and [34]. In the second,
qualitative phase we held a series of interviews with CEOs and key
managers of typical ﬁrms operating in the market for small,
medium and large sized systems to create a heterogeneous sam-
ple. Interviewees were selected based on a desk study and an
initial interview with an external expert, the chairman of PV
Vlaanderen (Flemish PV trade association). We conducted a total of
seven semi-structured interviews. The main goal was to obtain in-
depth input on how changes in support instruments had inﬂu-
enced the ﬁrms' activities and performance, thus supplementing
and validating our quantitative ﬁndings. The interviews were
transcribed and veriﬁed by the interviewees. In the ﬁnal phase, we
triangulated our ﬁndings with two experts in the ﬁeld: the
chairman of the Flemish PV trade association, and a business
developer in a European semi-governmental incubator in sus-
tainable energy who also co-founded a PV company during our
time of study.
Table 1
Average electricity prices in Belgium from 2007 until 2013, for residents (2500–
5000 kWh, including taxes and levies) as well as industrial customers (2006: 2000
MWh, 2007‐2013: 500‐2000 MWh; including taxes and levies) [39] and [40].
Year Residents (€/kWh) Industry (€/kWh)
2007 0.1683a 0.1149a
2008 0.2062 0.1228
2009 0.1890 0.1325
2010 0.1967 0.1275
2011 0.2128 0.1355
2012 0.2275 0.1321
2013 0.2194 0.1315
a Based on price in second semester only, because ﬁrst semester data was not
available.
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Fig. 2. The drop in PV system prices for households (o10 kWp) in Belgium
excluding operation and maintenance and VAT from 2008 until 2012 (adapted from
[41]).
J.C.C.M. Huijben et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 62 (2016) 1282–129012843. Results
VEA (Flemish Energy Agency) calculates the required levels of
governmental support by taking electricity and PV system prices
(including replacement of the inverter) as input [35]. We followed
this approach to ﬁrst study these prices in the various customer
segments in Flanders. We then reviewed the types of support in
the Flemish market between 2006 and 2013 and calculated their
relative contributions for typical small, medium and large sized
systems (see Appendix A). Taking the overall electricity and PV
system prices as input, we subsequently put our ﬁndings on sup-
port instruments into perspective. Next, we addressed the most
inﬂuential support instruments in place during our time of study,
the Green Certiﬁcate scheme. We end with an analysis of the effect
of support instruments on ﬁrm's activities and performance.
3.1. Electricity and PV system prices
Belgium's electricity market was liberalized from 1999 onwards
[36]. This led to varying electricity prices in the market, but the
trend is that large scale users (industry) pay lower prices than
residents [37–40]. Prices consist of several components including
the electricity price, contribution to renewable energy, heat and
power technology implementation, transmission and distribution
net tariffs, public charges, energy taxes and VAT [37]. Table 1 1
shows the average electricity prices for residents and industrial
customers in Belgium during our study.
On an average, industrial customers paid about two-thirds of
the residential price [39,40]. For 2012, large scale industrial users
(20 GWh per year) paid about half of the residential price [38].
Over time, prices for residents increased slightly, while medium
size industry prices remained stable [39,40].
Additionally, PV system prices in Flanders have decreased sub-
stantially (Fig. 2; [41]). This is in line with a general trend of
increasing production volumes resulting in lower system prices [42].
We could not ﬁnd any data directly comparing the prices for
small and large systems in Flanders. However, Barbose et al.
mapped US PV system prices for 1998–2012 and found that system
prices dropped by between 8% and 13% when comparing the
median price of residential systems (o10 kWp) to medium sized
(10–100 kWp) and large scale commercial systems (4100 kWp)
respectively [43]. We took the above as input for our calculations
on various support instruments (for support per Wp, see Section
3.2 and Appendix A) and to review their relative importance.1 Such data are not available at Flanders level. We followed Flemish Energy
Agency and Flemish PV trade association calculations, which are based on EURO-
STAT Belgium average electricity prices.3.2. PV support instruments
Our review of PV ﬁnancial support instruments showed that
some are only available for a speciﬁc size of system or are only
provided to a certain investing party (e.g. company with proﬁt).
We identiﬁed three types of support: investment support instru-
ments and tax deduction schemes aimed at reducing initial
investment barriers, production support instruments targeting
electricity production (i.e. support per kWh produced), and
ﬁnancial support instruments to cut credit costs (Table 2) (in line
with [6,7] and [8]). As one can see, some of these were started or
terminated at a later stage. Although the government did mostly
foot the bill, production support instruments also had a ﬁnancial
impact on energy suppliers, Distribution System Operators (DSOs),
residential, and industrial electricity consumers (including non-PV
owners), as we will further discuss below. Moreover, production
support instruments overlapped: green electricity certiﬁcates
(‘Groene stroom certiﬁcaten’, GSC, a kind of feed-in-tariff per
1000 kWh produced for a ﬁxed period, see below), net metering
(or net injection for a set rate if net metering was not allowed),
and direct self-consumption avoided buying electricity from the
grid, the latter two relating directly to the electricity price in place.
Furthermore, the level of GSC compensation was independent of
the amount of electricity self-consumed or fed into the grid [44].
Finally, individual support instruments changed substantially over
time, which is explained in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
3.2.1. Development of support instruments over time
In order to better understand the relative volume of support
instruments over time, we have calculated the support per Watt
peak of installed capacity (€/Wp) for three standardized systems: a
small residential system (2.23 kWp), a medium sized system
(25 kWp) at an SME, and a large industrial application (250 kWp),
corresponding to the typical gradation in support differentiation (see
Tables 3–5). Sector speciﬁc support was not included in these cal-
culations. For example, farmers could apply for 30% investment
support (excluding VAT) [45]. This support could not be combined
with other forms except GSC compensation. The source data, calcu-
lation method, and intermediate results are shown in Appendix A.
Until 2011, the support for small systems was similar to med-
ium and large systems (see Tables 3–5). Electricity prices for large
industrial users were a factor two lower than those for residents
(see also Section 3.1 on electricity prices above) [38]. At the same
time, PV system prices for larger systems were only about 13%
lower [43]. It is therefore surprising that medium and large scale
systems received similar levels of support as small systems.
Though PV system prices and electricity prices are not directly
linked per deﬁnition (i.e. a large industrial user may opt for a small
Table 2
Financial support instruments for residential and large scale systems from 2006 to 2013.
System size Support instrument Terminated
Residential (o10kWp) Production support
GSC (a kind of feed-in-tariff: a fee per 1000 kWh produced)
Self-consumption (avoid buying electricity from the grid)
Net metering (bidirectional reversing meter; electricity injected to the grid is deducted from elec-
tricity taken from the grid)
Investment support
Investment support for the Flanders region (certain amount to cover the investment costs) 31/08/2007
Premium by local municipalities (certain amount to cover investment costs, provided by local
municipalities)
Tax deduction on investment 27/11/2011
VAT reduction of 6% for renovation of private houses
Financing support
Tax deduction on mortgage loans
Green loan or mortgage interest reduction 27/03/2009a
31/12/2011
Bond fund providing low interest loans
Medium and large commercial systems
(410 kWp)
Production support
GSC
Self-consumption (avoid buying electricity from the grid)
Net injection tariff (individual deals for selling electricity to the grid)
Investment support
Ecology premium (certain amount to cover investment costs) 31/01/2011
Tax deduction on proﬁt
Investment support for farmers (certain amount to cover investment costs, only available to farmers) 10/3/2006 a
20/7/2012
Financing support
Interest reduction for farmers 10/3/2006a
20/7/2012
a regulations not in place in 2006, implemented on day/month/year.
Table 3
Development of support per Wp for a small residential system (o10 kWp) from 2006–2013 (€/Wp).
Year Regional investment support Municipal investment support Tax discount VAT discount GSC Net metering and self consumption Total
2006 0.70 0.28 0.84 1.08 6.52 2.55 11.96
2007 0.64a 0.28 1.08 0.95 6.52 2.57 12.04
2008 0.28 0.93 0.83 6.52 2.60 11.16
2009 0.28 0.85 0.75 6.52 2.62 11.02
2010 0.28 0.68 0.60 5.07 2.65 9.28
2011 0.28 0.59b 0.53 4.46c 2.68 8.53
2012 0.28 0.30 2.28c 2.70 5.56
2013 0.28 0.17 N.A.d 2.73 N.A.
a Until August 2007.
b Until November 2011.
c Average value over a year.
d GSC support ﬂuctuates over time for systems installed in 2013 making it impossible to calculate the overall contribution of GSC support.
Table 4
Development of support per Wp for a medium sized system of an SME (10–250 kWp)
from 2006–2013 (€/Wp).
Year Ecology
premium
Tax discount GSC Net metering and
injection
Total
2006 1.63 0.30 6.52 1.69 10.14
2007 0.99a 0.26 6.52 1.70 9.47
2008 0.31 0.23 6.52 1.72 8.77
2009 0.55 0.21 6.52 1.74 9.02
2010 0.15 0.17 5,07 1.75 7.14
2011 0.15 4.46a 1.77 6.37
2012 0.08 2.28a 1.78 4.14
2013 0.05 N.A.b 1.80 N.A.
a Average value over a year.
b GSC support ﬂuctuates over time for systems installed in 2013 making it
impossible to calculate the overall contribution of GSC support.
Table 5
Development of support per Wp for a large industrial system (4250 kWp) from
2006–2013 (€/Wp).
Year Ecology
premium
Tax discount GSC Net metering and
injection
Total
2006 1.09 0.30 6.52 1.21 9.12
2007 0.63a 0.26 6.52 1.22 8.63
2008 0.14 0.23 6.52 1.23 8.12
2009 0.26 0.21 6.52 1.24 8.23
2010 0.07 0.17 5.07 1.25 6.56
2011 0.15 3.80a 1.26 5.21
2012 0.08 1.04a 1.28 2.40
2013 0.05 N.A.b 1.28 N.A.
a Average value over a year.
b GSC support ﬂuctuates over time for systems installed in 2013 making it
impossible to calculate the overall contribution of GSC support.
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electricity users paying higher electricity prices and vice versa.
Thus, smaller systems were relatively more attractive to the endusers. However, the level of support for large systems was still
sufﬁcient for them to grow extensively (see Fig. 1). Some compa-
nies even deliberately decided to focus on the large scale segment
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Fig. 3. Development of green certiﬁcate (GSC) compensation for both households
and large installations (Light gray: 4250 kW) from 2006 till January 2013 (adapted
from [49]). Note that from August 2012, the duration of GSC compensation was
reduced from 20 to 10 years.
2 PV Vlaanderen, personal communication. PV Vlaanderen estimates total costs
at €1.8 billion, supporting that we are conservative in our estimates. The difference
can be attributed to the fact that we used assigned GSCs published by VREG as
input instead of installed capacity numbers (indirect calculation method). We also
took system degradation into account. The data ﬁle with calculations is available
from the authors upon request.
3 A prosumer is a consumer who also produces electricity. Prosumer is a
conﬂation of the terms consumer and producer.
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reasons.
Another conclusion is that the GSC feed-in-tariff compensation
(€/Wp) was the main driver for the exponential growth of instal-
led PV capacity in Flanders. This was further conﬁrmed by all our
interviewees and [36]. We will discuss the GSC support instrument
in more detail in Section 3.2.2. However, net metering and self-
consumption were also substantial. After 2012, when the GSC level
dropped considerably, net metering and self-consumption of
electricity became the major shielding instruments for small
residential and large industrial systems.
3.2.2. The GSC support instrument
The introduction of GSC certiﬁcates has been highly signiﬁcant
for the Flemish PV market. The support instrument is a hybrid
support scheme combining a feed-in-tariff and a Renewable
Portfolio Standard (RPS), as we will further elaborate below [7,46]
and [47]. From 2006 onwards, for every MWh of renewable energy
produced (also non-PV), a premium was granted, which was
guaranteed for a period of twenty years, thereby functioning as a
feed-in-tariff for PV producers [44,48,49]. In order to apply for a
GSC, safety standards have to be met and a special permit has to be
obtained before the installation can become operational [50]. For
PV producers it is important to deal with this timely, in order to
meet the deadline for the current GSC compensation level and
thus avoid lower compensation. VREG is responsible for assigning
the GSCs [31] and [48]. It also announces adaptations to the GSC
level on its website and via its newsletter [51,52]. The timing of
such announcements used to vary and sometimes entrepreneurs
had to adapt their organizations quickly (see Section 3.3). How-
ever, from 2013 onwards, the GSC instrument is evaluated every
six months to one year and adaptations are reported shortly after
the evaluation [53]. Residents with systems smaller than 10 kWp
have to report their production to VREG (i.e. a production meter is
installed) [44]. For larger systems, the DSO reports to VREG. The
DSO pays the GSC compensation to the PV electricity producer
(both for small or large scale systems) [54].
Energy suppliers are obliged by the Flemish government to
meet a quotum in renewable energy production [47]. In order to
meet this quotum, they have to produce renewable energy
themselves or buy certiﬁcates from others. If they cannot comply
with the set targets, they have to pay a ﬁne, which was €125 per
certiﬁcate until March 2012, €118 until March 2013 and €100
thereafter [47,55]. The prices on the certiﬁcate market were
somewhat below these ﬁnes, varying between €109 (average price
1 april 2006  31 march 2007) and €100 (average price 1 april
2012  31 march 2013) [56]. Thus, for systems installed in most of
our period of study it was more favorable for PV producers to sell
their certiﬁcates to the DSO, rather than trading them on the
certiﬁcate market. This resulted in ﬁnancial losses for the DSOs
who had to buy certiﬁcates for prices they could not recuperate
when trading them on the certiﬁcate market. Only when GSC
levels dropped to €90 per certiﬁcate and below (see Fig. 3 below),
it became attractive to sell them on the certiﬁcate market. How-
ever, some producers still decided to sell their certiﬁcates to the
DSO [57]. The loss the DSOs made was compensated by increasing
the net tariff for their customers, in particular residents (low
voltage), who pay 80% of the total costs [47]. Additionally, sup-
pliers charged their customers for the GSC transaction costs by
adding a fee to the existing electricity price [47,58]. Thus, GSC
compensation was not paid by the Flemish government from
taxes, but ﬁnanced via the energy bills. Also electricity suppliers
spread the GSC costs they made unevenly over customers; large
industrial customers got a discount [47]. For 2010, green certiﬁcate
compensation was not paid for about 10% of all electricity supply.
The Flemish PV trade association estimated that 75% of all GSCcosts from PV were allocated to low voltage end users like resi-
dents and SMEs in 2012 [59]. Thus, those beneﬁtting from the GSC
compensation instrument were not equally carrying the load.
Furthermore, total costs related to GSCs for the period 2006–
2013 were estimated at €1.5 billion2. These costs will remain high
since GSCs are assigned for a period of 10 to 20 years. Costs related
to GSCs assigned in the period 2006–2013 are estimated to be €6.7
billion for the period 2014-2031 (€5.1 billion if corrected for the
time value of money). For 2012, this corresponded to €35 for an
average household using 3500 kWh per year [59]. We expect this
number to rise in future years because of increased installed
capacity numbers and the ongoing costs of already assigned GSC
certiﬁcates.
Finally, while prosumers3 do proﬁt from GSC compensation,
they contribute less to the GSC instrument since the costs are
calculated per kWh consumed from the grid [47]. In order to
compensate for this, from January 2013 onwards, all PV owners of
systems smaller than 10 kWp were charged for use of the network
(i.e. per kWp) [60]. However, PV Vlaanderen fought the imple-
mentation of the network tariff and won the case in November
2013 [61]. Their main argument was the inequality with large scale
electricity producers who paid much less for using the same
electricity network [62]. This indicates that the PV niche has
gained momentum, having triggered a broader discussion on
existing mainstream energy rules and regulations and the alloca-
tion of costs and beneﬁts.
3.2.2.1. Level of GSC compensation for PV producers. From its start in
2006, a distinction was made between compensation per GSC for
systems smaller and larger than 250 kWp (Fig. 3). From 2006 until
2009, GSC compensation was very high, with 450 Euros granted to
every GSC. But after August 2012, there was a sharp decline for
small systems. From then on, GSC compensation was only assured
for a period of 10 years, both for small and large scale systems [49].
Interestingly, GSC compensation for small and large systems was
Table 6
Banding factors for small (o10 kWp), medium (10–250 kWp) and large systems
(4250-r750 kWp) installed in 2013. The lower the banding factor, the more kWh
correspond to one GSC, which is worth €93 ([63] and [64]). The number of
kWh needed per GSC is indicated in parentheses and thus shifts over time (GSCs
are assigned for 15 years).
System size Banding factor Jan 1-July
31 2013
Banding factor Aug 1- Feb
16 2014
r10 kWp 0.23(4348) 0.28(3571)
410-r250 kWp 0.63(1587) 0.72(1389)
4250- r750 kWp 0.49(2041) 0.57(1754)
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compensation for large systems decreased faster (Fig. 3).
In January 2013, a new GSC compensation instrument covered
three categories: r10 kWp, 410-r250 kWp and 4250-
r750 kWp, for which different banding factors were assigned
[63]. The lower the banding factor, the more kWhs correspond to
one GSC (Table 6), which is worth €93 [64].
VEA calculates the banding factors for both new and existing
systems every six months to one year, taking into account PV
system prices, inverter replacement costs (i.e. main maintenance
cost), and electricity prices [35] and [53]. In case the banding
factor deviates more than 2% from the actual banding factor it is
adapted [53]. The new banding factors are enacted one month
after publication of the evaluation report of the VEA [65]. The new
GSC support instrument can thus be considered as a feed-in-
premium co-evolving with electricity prices rather than a ﬁxed
feed-in-tariff [7]. From 2013 onwards banding factors for systems
installed will be updated every six months. It is therefore impos-
sible to calculate the expected overall support from GSC for sys-
tems installed after this date since this requires all future banding
factors to be included. However, as Table 6 shows, levels of support
are expected to be lower than the previous level of €90 per GSC in
2012, at least for 2013 [49,63] and [64].
3.3. The effect of support instruments on ﬁrm activities and
performance
Our interviews revealed how the different support instruments
in place over time affected ﬁrm level activities and performance.
Fueled by high levels of governmental support, mainly in the form
of GSC, the residential and commercial market in Flanders showed
exponential growth from 2006 onwards (see Fig. 1). Relatively high
levels of support compensated for the low electricity prices paid
by commercial customers, thereby creating ﬁnancially attractive
business cases. Some companies started to provide ﬁnancing
solutions to their customers. One company offered a rent-a-roof
solution from 2009 until July 2012, the period with relatively high
GSC compensation for medium sized systems (o250 kW; Fig. 3).
However, when GSC compensation was lowered, the business
proposition had to be abandoned:
“At some point, renting a roof became impossible. You had to
spread your margins over too many players and you just could not
do it without the subsidy”
(Interview with Solar Company A)
Moreover, with decreasing support levels, entrepreneurs nee-
ded to shift to other customer segments with relatively high
electricity prices and support in place. For example, one company
reoriented to the 10–250 kWp segment in 2013, since this had the
highest level of support:
“Suddenly the situation has totally changed, much faster than
we expected. You have to adapt your business to thesecircumstances, you have to focus on other segments….We had
to reorient to 10–250 kWp…we need to continually adapt.”
(Interview with Solar Company C)
This shift in targeted customer segment also matched the
installed capacity numbers for small, medium and large systems
(Fig. 1), showing how medium sized systems continued to be
installed in 2012, unlike large systems with low levels of support
from January 2012. The above quote also shows the need for a
ﬂexible organization, especially in times of decreasing support, for
example by hiring temporary staff only. Furthermore, as can be
seen in Fig. 3, from July 2011, GSC compensation was reduced
every few months. Since customers wanted to beneﬁt from the
higher tariff rates, deadlines became stricter, requiring fast adap-
tation of the ﬁrm:
“This peak changed from once per year, to once every ten
months, to once every three months….In order to handle those
peaks, you need to better organize and coordinate the pur-
chasing. The internal dynamics have to change drastically in
order to ﬁnish the projects on time.”
(Interview with Solar Company C)
Entrepreneurs also made smart adaptations in order to obtain
maximum beneﬁt from the support available. For example, by
spreading an invoice over two years, residents could avoid the
maximum cap for tax reduction, thereby proﬁting from higher tax
discounts. In a public-private PV project, an extra ﬁrm had to be
started up in order to apply for the ecology premium. In another
case, this was done via selling one share to another company.
However, this also led to discussions on regulations related to the
support instrument, sometimes even via a court case. An energy
cooperative applied for an ecology premium for installing PV, and
had to go to court to obtain it since the support instrument was
originally meant for companies only [66].
Finally, implemented support instruments might have been
counterproductive. Since VAT reductions only applied to houses
more than ﬁve years old, this delayed rather than supported
investments in PV. However, such anticipation of future support
(i.e. a more proﬁtable value proposition for the customer) may
have had negative consequences:
“There are examples of new houses that were built ready to install
PV panels (cabling, roof mounting) but waited ﬁve years for actual
installation…. When GSC began to drop, some regretted that and
decided not to wait ﬁve years, but other people were too late”
(Interview with the PV trade association)
The above discussion shows how the different support instru-
ments in place have shaped ﬁrm activities and may even have
been counterproductive. Moreover, costs for complying with
market regulations may actually counteract the available support
instruments in place. This is in line with Hoogma showing that
niche shielding is always partial in nature [67]. For example, a
bank explained why they did not provide a lease offer for resi-
dential customers:
“There is extra protection for private persons (for lease), strict
regulations. It is possible, but the costs don’t match the beneﬁts
because of the enormous amount of paperwork. Also, a special
permit is needed.”
(Interview with a bank)
One interviewee reported how a large scale project was stop-
ped by energy and building market regulations:
“Regulation was implemented to stop it…It has a very volatile
production proﬁle, which is difﬁcult to integrate in the net…no
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permits were not granted.”
(Interview with Business Developer X)
The above examples show how mainstream regulations also
affect ﬁrm performance and the effectiveness of support instru-
ments. Regulations can even hinder or block particular ﬁrm
activities despite sufﬁcient levels of governmental ﬁnancial sup-
port in place [68] and [69]. Related ‘soft costs’ include access to the
grid and balancing, spatial planning and permission, and can
counteract governmental support instruments [46] and [70].
Morris considers grid access an essential ‘layer of access’ for
implementing a variety of local renewable energy frameworks [71,
p20]. Regulations may thus be related to non-energy areas like
building, demonstrating how multiple mainstream systems can
affect a single niche innovation. This becomes even more evident
with Building Integrated PV solutions, where the building sector
strongly affects niche development [72].
Governments thus play a dual role in shaping solar PV markets.
First, available support instruments provide entrepreneurial oppor-
tunities to the ﬁrm. Second, mainstream regulations force entrepre-
neurs to adapt their ﬁrms which may even lead to blocking of par-
ticular business propositions, despite sufﬁcient levels of support.4. Discussion
Triggered by high levels of governmental support, the Flemish
PV market has shown extensive growth over recent years, in
particular between 2006 and 2012. This study provides insight
into which aspects of the Flanders region of Belgium’ support
instruments fueled this growth. From the entrepreneurship lit-
erature perspective, governmental policies represent a particular
source of entrepreneurial opportunity [9]. Similarly, institutional
theorists argue that institutional processes (rules, norms, beliefs)
inﬂuence economic systems [10]. Indeed we found a range of
support instruments to affect the Flemish market and ﬁrm activ-
ities and performance over time, with the GSC scheme as the main
market shaping instrument. Additionally, our review shows how
conﬂicting regulations, originating from mainstream systems like
building or ﬁnance may unintentionally limit the effectiveness of
support policies in place (i.e. in line with [46] and [70]).
The provisions at the higher, more aggregated energy system
level directly inﬂuenced the opportunities for cost and beneﬁt
allocation and ﬁnancial attractiveness of more locally embedded
PV entrepreneurial activities. Active shielding of the Flemish PV
niche became highly dynamic, with ﬁnancial support available at
various governmental levels [6]. Entrepreneurs exploited such
opportunities by adapting their organizations. Sometimes this has
led to working in the ‘gray areas’ of regulations related to support
instruments. The high GSC compensation was signiﬁcant, making
PV attractive even for large scale projects with relatively low
electricity prices. Additionally, external investors got involved in
providing ﬁnance for residential and commercial applications.
However, when GSC compensation was reduced, the market
proved to be still highly dependent on support and stagnated. A
similar situation occurred in Italy in 2013, where cuts in ﬁnancial
support for PV deployment resulted in severe market decline [2].
Flemish businesses shifted towards smaller systems where PV was
still competitive thanks to higher electricity prices and higher GSC
compensation. A new regulation in January 2014 enforces the use
of renewable energy in new houses and ofﬁce buildings [73]. This
shows that the market is still dependent on active shielding in
some form; however this is a quantity driven instrument rather
than direct economic support and, as such, does not directly affect
governmental budgets [7].Additionally, the cost and beneﬁt allocation over different sta-
keholders at the higher energy system level should be carefully
managed by policy makers. The regional government of Flanders
deﬁnitely succeeded in substantially increasing the installed capa-
city for PV, mainly through GSC. The unique characteristic of GSC is
that it has never been part of the governmental budget, repre-
senting therefore a relatively safe support strategy with no evident
need for an exit strategy on the policy side [47]. However, the down
side is that the cost of the GSC support instrument, which had no
cap in terms of installed capacity, has rocketed. As support is
granted for a period of up to twenty years, declining support levels
will only be felt after many years and will not change the big picture
in the short run. GSC also provides investors with lower investment
risks compared to net metering, which can be altered or even exited
at any time by the government [46]. However, the sudden changes
in the level of GSC support created many difﬁculties for companies
and led to a low level of certainty for investors. Our analyses further
revealed that the costs of the GSC support instrument have been
distributed unevenly, with residents paying the most via their
electricity bill. Similar to other countries, it was the business sector
and the large-scale electricity users that beneﬁted relatively more
from governmental support. This indicates that design of policy
instruments is not only about who receives support, but also who
pays for it (policy equity) [8]. These are political choices, whereby
attractiveness not only depends on the level of support, but also on
the regulated electricity prices for the particular segment along
with the system installation costs. In the case of Flanders, those
beneﬁtting were not equally carrying the load, which caused fric-
tion. This has already led to broader discussions on cost and beneﬁt
allocation in the current mainstream energy production and con-
sumption system, a recent example being the tariff for PV owners
using the grid. In response to the new tariff, the ‘Organisatie voor
Duurzame Energie’ (ODE; Organization for renewable energy)
appealed in December 2012:
“We plea for a thorough debate, including all stakeholders, where
all elements - costs and beneﬁts- will be taken into account for
calculating a legitimate network tariff.” [74]
Such debates could also open up existing system structures,
thereby paving the way for further PV market growth and the
building of an electricity system that deviates from the status quo
[6]. We also see how removing support instruments from a gov-
ernment's national budget can become problematic over time, thus
necessitating new interventions that disturb market development.
Finally, our focus was deliberately not on how the support
instruments and mainstream regulations came into place (e.g. via
lobbying processes and power struggles), although this could be
an interesting complementary line of research related to the
institutional theory stream of literature [10]. In this respect, the
cost-beneﬁt allocation over the various players in the world of
energy systems could provide valuable insights. Schaltegger and
Wagner (2011) consider such activities of institutional entrepre-
neurship to be at the heart of sustainable entrepreneurship, which
does not only focus on individual ﬁrm success, but rather on
creating favorable market conditions and wider social change [75].
Thompson et al. (2014) were the ﬁrst to explore how sustainable
entrepreneurs engage in institutional entrepreneurship, for
example by introduction of new symbols and quantifying mea-
sures [76]. However, more research on these processes is needed,
including different contexts and differentiating between indivi-
dual and collective efforts.
5. Conclusion
This paper has shown how governmental support instruments
like the GSC shape the business environment and the
J.C.C.M. Huijben et al. / Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 62 (2016) 1282–1290 1289opportunities for companies. We approached this issue from a
socio-technical perspective and analyzed the impact of support
instruments for solar PV in the Flanders region of Belgium from
2006–2013. Niche entrepreneurs actively build their companies
based on available support schemes. A range of production,
investment and ﬁnancing support instruments was available.
However, some of these were counteracted by ﬁnancial, building
and energy market regulations in place. The GSC support instru-
ment was found to be the most important for market develop-
ment. Related costs proved to be extremely high and unevenly
distributed over different stakeholders, indicating the need for a
careful assessment of cost-beneﬁt allocation over the energy
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